Projecto e património edificado em São Paulo. Três casos como práticas de mudança.
Carolina Miguel dos Santos Barreiros
2013-11-06
Search results
You search for select and 333,176 records were found.
This website contains information about the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (JSC), a bipartisan committee charged with authoring a recommendation on how to reduce the U.S. deficit by $1.5 trillion over ten years. It includes information about the rules of the committee, the members, and press releases.
Worldwide demographic changes and their implications for governments, corporations, and individuals have been in the focus of public interest for quite some time due to the fiscal risk related to adequate retirement benefits. Through a more detailed analysis of mortality data an additional type of risk can be identified: differences in mortality improvements by birth year, also known as "cohort effects."
Previous contributions have, however, not formalized a suitable measure to further investigate mortality improvements but rather relied on graphical representations without particular focus on individual cohorts but groups of the overall population. No criterion to identify single birth year cohorts as select has been established. A simple criterion for identifying select cohorts is proposed and used here to what country mortality dat...
mortality improvement; longevity trend; select cohort; longevity risk
VI Workshop de Procesamiento Distribuido y Paralelo (WPDP)
This thesis explores how organisations manage new product development (NPD) focused innovation across a portfolio of core, adjacent and breakthrough environments. The study focuses on the search and select phases of the innovation process, and how incumbents identify and validate a range of opportunities. Organisations face the paradox of how to establish search and select routines for focal markets, while also setting up routines to sense and respond to disruptive innovation signals from adjacent and more peripheral environments. The study builds on research into peripheral vision, and considers how organisations operationalise innovation search and select in disrupting environments.
To analyse how organisations manage search and select in turbulent environments, the author conducted research in the disrupting higher education (H...
We consider a government auctioning off multiple licences to firms that compete in an aftermarket. Firms have different costs, and cost-efficiency is private information in the auction and in the aftermarket. If only one licence is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction as it has the highest valuation for the licence. We analyse conditions under which this result does and does not generalise to the case of auctioning multiple licences and aftermarket competition. Strategic interaction in the aftermarket is responsible for the fact that auctions may select inefficient firms. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2009.
Selecting items from a collection is one of the most common tasks
users perform with graphical user interfaces. Practically every
application supports this task with a selection feature different
from that of any other application. Defects are common,
especially in manipulating selections of non-adjacent elements,
and flexible selection features are often missing when they would
clearly be useful. As a consequence, user effort is wasted. The
loss of productivity is experienced in small doses, but all
computer users are impacted. The undesirable state of support
for multi-element selection prevails because the same selection
features are redesigned and reimplemented repeatedly. This
article seeks to establish common abstractions for
multi-selection. It gives generic but precise meanings to
selection operations and makes multi-selection...
This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage. If only one license is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction (license) as it will get the highest profit in the aftermarket, i.e., it has the highest valuation for the license. This paper argues that this result does not generalize to the case of multiple licenses and aftermarket competition. In particular, we determine conditions under which auctions may select inefficient firms and therefore lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. Strategic interactions in the aftermarket, in particular firms’ preferences to compete with the least cost-efficient ...
